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In this paper I outline two kinds of functionalism, role and
realizer functionalism, as general accounts of scientific composi-
tion.  I then argue that realizer functionalism is unable to deliver
an appropriate notion of scientific compositional explanation. I
argue this point by explaining and diagnosing the distinctive prob-
lem with the dormative fallacy and by arguing that realizer func-
tionalism shares this problem. To be more precise, I argue that the
kinds of compositional explanations that obtain if realizer func-
tionalism is correct share the same vice as the dormative fallacy.
Since we ought to reject explanations that commit the dormative
fallacy, we ought also to reject realizer functionalist compositional
explanations, and by corollary, realizer functionalism itself. I con-
clude that these considerations give us a powerful reason to favor
role functionalism over realizer functionalism.
I.  INTRODUCTION
In this paper I will be considering an argument against realizer
functionalism and in favor of role functionalism as a general theory of
reduction in the sciences. I will first describe the two views. I will then
argue that realizer functionalism cannot offer the kind of mechanistic ex-
planation that we look for in the sciences. I will illustrate this by showing
an important similarity it bears to a fallacy in reasoning.
II.  THE TWO VIEWS
There are two presuppositions that will be useful for us in under-
standing these two theories. The first is the causal theory of properties
and the second is the distinction between higher and lower order proper-
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ties. The causal theory of properties is the view that properties are iden-
tical with or individuated by their causal powers.1 The property of being
acidic causes corrosion in metal. We distinguish it from other properties
by the distinct features of its effects. We call these affects of a property its
causal role. Second, there are higher and lower order properties.2 Some
property A is of a higher order than some property B iff the substance
exemplifying A is made up by that substance which exemplifies B. The
property of acidity, for example, is a higher order property than the prop-
erty of having a certain charge. The former is a property of chemicals,
while the latter is a property of particles. But since chemicals are com-
posed of particles, the property of the chemical is the higher order prop-
erty. There is some sense in which the property of acidity is made up out
of those lower order physical properties. What we want to know is what
that sense is.
Let us consider first role functionalism. A property is that which
contributes causal powers to individuals. Let’s say that the specific causal
patterns the property brings about when it is instantiated is its m-role.
The m-role of a property allows certain individuals to interact in certain
specific causal processes. An m-role is a particular function, a causal rela-
tion between properties.3 Lower order properties, the properties of phys-
ics, also stand in causal relations. Both higher and lower order properties
have m-roles. Let’s call the relation of a higher order property to a lower
order property in a composed entity m-realization. It is a making up rela-
tion. The causal roles of the lower order properties m-realize the causal
roles of the higher order properties. The causal roles of the physical par-
ticles of acids and metals m-realize the causal roles of acidity and corro-
sion.
The m-role of a higher order property is a function; a pattern of
inputs and outputs. It is a specific pattern of causal relations. The prop-
erty of acidity has as part of its m-role the specific pattern of causing
corrosion when coming into contact with metal. As we will see, there is
controversy between the realizer and role functionalist about whether or
not the patterns of these m-roles can be generalized. That is, over whether
any characterization of properties must take into account the topic spe-
cific aspects of these patterns. If one takes to heart the notion of an m-
role as a kind of pattern, it will become apparent that there can be no
necessity to the way in which it is realized. Consider the pattern of the
symbols of English that I now use to write. That pattern could be realized
on paper, or in stone, or on a computer screen as it is now. It is generally
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held that two things cannot be identical unless they are coextensive. If a is
identical with b, then a is coextensive with b. It is not possible to have b
without a, and vice versa. It is evident then, that the role functionalist
cannot regard higher order properties as being identical with the lower
order properties. The higher order properties of the sciences are com-
posed by lower order properties, but they are not identical with them.
The higher order properties and the lower order properties in a com-
posed entity could theoretically come apart. The higher order property of
being money is realized by lower order properties of paper in some in-
stances, but it can also be realized by the metal in coins and in innumerous
other ways. This is called multiple realization. Acidity has real ontologi-
cal status, and so do those properties that realize it.
On this view there are many layers of properties in the special
sciences, one layer composed by some other layer whose properties are
the subject of some yet more fundamental science, yet none of the layers
is identical with the others. Each of the layers can be explained by the
lower layers. The explanation of higher order properties in terms of lower
order properties is done in terms of the making up relation, the relation of
m-realization that one layer bears to another. To explain a higher order
property in terms of a lower order property is to give an account of those
lower order properties and of how they compose the higher order prop-
erty. It is to tell what properties compose that higher order property and
to map out their relations.4 The job of the scientist is to give us the details
of this composition and this mapping. Although the properties of the spe-
cial sciences can be explained in terms of their kindred sciences, none can
be absolutely reduced to the other. The special sciences cannot be dis-
pensed with.
Now that we have seen the role functionalist’s view of the making
up relation in the sciences, we can contrast it with realizer functionalism
as developed and defended by David Lewis. According to Lewis (1972),
in order to explain higher order properties we must first topic neutrally
characterize the properties of our higher order sciences.5 This involves
taking the causal role of some higher order property and characterizing it
by means of a Ramsey sentence.6 A Ramsey sentence describes the causal
role of a property; its L-role. To create a Ramsey sentence one takes all of
the theoretical entities of a scientific theory and turns them into “variables
bound by existential quantifiers”. (Lewis, 1972, pg.251) Take some par-
ticular explanation: The Ice caused Joe to fall. To Ramsify the sentence
we would take each of our theoretical entities, ‘Joe’ and ‘Ice’ and turn
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them into variables bound by an existential quantifier. Our explanation
would then begin with, “there is an x, there is a y…” and we would then
link each of the variables with a ‘caused by’ connective or predicate.7 In
this way we would produce an explanatory sentence devoid of any spe-
cific reference to the world. Lewis thinks that the resulting sentence, in
this case, something like, ‘there is an x, there is a y and x caused y to fall',
has just as much explanatory power as did our original sentence.8
What you are left with is a highly abstracted, topic neutral de-
scription of the causal role of the higher order properties of that theory.
After Ramsification, there is nothing but the most general abstract form
of the causal relation left in the sentence. The functional role of the higher
order property is the causal relationship specified by a particular Ramsey
sentence. To play that functional role is to be the state of affairs that
satisfies that Ramsey sentence. A lower order property L-realizes a higher
order property just in case that lower order property satisfies the Ramsey
sentence describing the causal relations of the higher order property. The
relation of lower order properties to higher order properties is a semantic
relation.
We are now in a position to see the implications of this theory. If
the causal role of the higher order properties just is this topic neutral
characterization and if to play a causal role is to be a state of affairs that
satisfies that characterization, then it seems that one will have good grounds
for alleging the identity of these higher order properties with lower order
ones.9 For if one argues, as does the role functionalist, that higher and
lower order properties are not identical, then, given the causal theory of
properties, there needs be some way of distinguishing the causal roles of
the higher order properties from those of the lower order properties. But
if one describes causal roles as does Lewis there will be no satisfactory
way to do this.10 If one were able to specify such a difference detectable in
the Ramsey sentence, then the higher order property and the lower order
property would no longer have anything in common.11 There would be no
similarity that explains why the one composes the other.12 Why not then,
says Lewis, reduce all those so-called higher order properties to the most
fundamental properties of our most fundamental science, namely those of
the fundamental particles of physics? It would appear that accepting topic
neutral characterization and the causal theory of properties gives one
good reason to think that higher order properties are identical with physi-
cal properties.
Combining these two ideas, his definition of a function13 and the
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identity statement in question gives Lewis a powerful argument for abso-
lute and complete reductionism in the sciences. Lewis (1972, pg.249)
argues as follows:
(1) A higher order property P, is identical with the prop-
erty that plays a particular causal role R that is charac-
terized by some topic neutral Ramsey sentence. (Defi-
nition)
(2) The property that plays role R is identical with some
lower order physical property Q.
(3) Therefore, the higher order property P is identical with
some physical property Q.14
On this view, what initially appeared as many layers of properties
is really only one. The predicates of the higher order sciences refer to
fundamental physical properties. In principle, if we were adept enough at
our quantum physics, we could completely do away with all of the special
sciences. We keep them around only for the sake of practicality.
As we have seen, a main point of contention between these two
views is their view of the making up relation. Science seeks mechanistic
explanations in terms of the making up relation. Lewis argues that this
relation is one of identity. To identify some property P that makes up
some other property Q is merely to discover that P is identical with Q.15
For the role functionalist, on the other hand, to discover that P makes up
Q is to discover two ontologically distinct properties and some special
relation between them. The main point of dispute is over the following
question: Is the making up relation in the special sciences one of identity?
In the next section I will attempt to answer the question in the negative.
III.  THE DORMATIVE FALLACY AND IDENTITY THEORY
I will first argue that a proper notion of composition in the sci-
ences must allow us to use it as a mechanistic explanation. I will then
argue that the identity view of composition does not render a mechanistic
explanation. I will argue this point by first explaining the dormative virtue
fallacy. Second, I will diagnose what I take to be the flaw in this explana-
tion and show that the identity theory shares this flaw. I will conclude by
discussing one possible objection to this argument and offering a response.
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Any adequate notion of scientific ‘making up’ must accord with
common scientific practice. The composition relation in the sciences is
commonly taken to do a certain kind of explanatory work. It is taken to
give us a mechanistic explanation. The fact that diamond atoms are com-
posed of carbon atoms is supposed to mechanistically explain the behav-
ior of diamonds. How those carbon atoms are bonded is supposed to
explain mechanistically why the diamond has the properties it has.
In his 1673 play “Le Malade Imaginaire”, Moliere mocks tradi-
tional Aristotelian explanations. In the famous passage he asks a doctor
why opium puts people to sleep. The doctor responds, “Because there is
a dormative virtue in it whose nature is to cause the senses to become
drowsy”. This example has become a paradigm case of a bad explanation.
In what follows I will refer to it as the dormative fallacy.
But why is this a bad explanation? The doctor was asked about a
particular property of opium. He was asked why opium has this property
and not another. The doctor’s answer was to explain the property of caus-
ing people to be sleepy in terms of the property of ‘having a dormative
virtue’? We explain properties in terms of other properties all the time. As
I mentioned above, we take it that the properties of carbon atoms give an
appropriate explanation for the hardness of the diamond. Why is it that, in
this case, we are unwilling to accept the doctor’s explanation? The an-
swer is very simple. The ‘dormative virtue’ is simply another name for the
property in question. The dormative virtue is identical with the property
of putting people to sleep. The reason why this explanation bothers us is
that the names involved are close enough to one another that they reveal
this identity. The name ‘dormative virtue’ is close enough to ‘the prop-
erty of making someone sleepy’ that we cannot help but notice that they
have the same referent. The names reveal the structure of the explanation
to us; they reveal that the structure of that explanation is one of identity.
It seems that mechanistic explanation derives its power from being able
to explain one thing in virtue of a different but related thing. We were
looking for a mechanistic explanation here and instead we got an expla-
nation of identity. Proper mechanistic explanations must proceed by ex-
plaining one property in terms of a different but related property.
The identity theory tells us that the making up relation is one of
identity. It tells us that higher order properties are identical with lower
order properties. It tells us that the property of hardness is identical with
the property of carbon atoms being bonded in a certain way. It is an ex-
planation of the same form as the dormative fallacy.
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Clearly the identity theory bears a relevant analogy to the dormative fal-
lacy. If we are to reject one, we should reject the other. Since we should
reject the dormative fallacy, we should also reject the identity theory of
composition.
The Lewisian might object to this argument by pointing out that
there are instances, even within the sciences themselves, where we take
identity to be an informative explanation. Consider the case of Clark Kent
and Superman. One might ask what explains the queer fact that they never
appear together in the same place. Surely a good answer to that question
is that Clark Kent is identical with Superman. We would not feel the need
for any further explanation in this case. Or consider the case of Hesperus
and Phosphorus. It was a significant scientific discovery that the two are
in fact the same planet, Venus. The realizer functionalist might ask why
we are prepared to accept identity in these cases as an explanation, but
not in others.
My response is that I have not here claimed that identity state-
ments can never be informative at all or that they can never count as
explanations or play some part in a scientific theory. Rather, what I have
argued is that they cannot render explanations of a certain sort. They
cannot offer us appropriate mechanistic explanations. This is what the
scientists take themselves to be doing when they discover compositional
relations. Clearly, the examples given above are not attempts at composi-
tional explanations.
Identity relations are, many times, adequate answers to the ques-
tion of how two different phenomena are related. Our question about
Superman, for example, is just such a question. That Clark Kent is iden-
tical with Superman is a good answer to the question of how the observa-
tion I call Clark Kent is related to the observation I call Superman. It is a
good answer to why I never seem to make both of those observations at
the same time. The reason is that to observe Clark Kent is to observe
Superman. Mechanistic explanations, by contrast, seek an answer to the
question of why a particular property behaves the way it does rather than
some other way, and it is here that identity cannot help us. What we need
is an explanation in terms of the properties and dispositions of something
different. We consider the dormitave fallacy a fallacy because we are look-
ing for a mechanistic explanation. We do not consider it a good answer
because it answers the wrong question. It tells us that Clark Kent can fly
when we really wanted to know how.
The identity theory can give us an informative answer to the ques-
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tion of how higher order properties are related to lower order properties.
Only it cannot give us an appropriate mechanistic explanation, which is
what the scientists take themselves to be doing. At the very least, the
identity theory is committed to a very strong error theory. It commits us
to the view that scientists who take themselves to be offering mechanistic
explanations are really offering explanations of a very different sort. To
accept the identity theory then is to embrace a very different picture of
the scientific enterprise. It is to accept a view of scientific explanation
that is both counterintuitive and does not accord with actual scientific
practice. These considerations against the identity view of the composi-
tional relation give us a strong reason to prefer role functionalism to real-
izer functionalism as a general account of making up in the sciences.
Endnotes
1See Shoemaker (1984), where he advances the view that the causal power
of a property is what individuates the property, or “what determines its identity”.
(pg.212) He says the account is “intended to capture what is correct in the vew that
properties just are powers, or that all properties are dispositional, while acknowledg-
ing the truth of a standard objection to that view, namely that a thing’s powers or
dispositions are distinct from, because ‘grounded in’, it’s intrinsic properties”. (pg.213)
2To completely pacify the realizer functionalist, I should more correctly phrase
the distinction linguistically, in terms of the reference and reduction of certain scien-
tific predicates to others. But I think this will involve needless complication. For
now, just note that the use of the terms higher and lower order properties in the
description of the two theories does not mean that either theory has any ontological
commitments in regard to these properties. It will become clear later on what those
ontological commitments are, i.e., that the realizer functionalist, strictly speaking,
does not really believe in higher order properties.
3Or between individuals via their properties.
4The views set out by Lewis in his seminal 1972 article are paridigmatic of
realizer functionalism. In that paper he sets up his theory in opposition to a theory of
reduction by which identifications are made “by positing bridge laws identifying
some of the entities discussed in one theory with entities discussed in another
theory…Identification are made, not found”. But I’m here taking role functionalism
as asserting not that bridge principles are created that allow us, for the sake of parsi-
mony, to speak in a certain useful way, but rather that the bridge principles them-
selves are discovered as a part of a compositional relation between two types of enti-
ties. (pg.249).
5That is, the sciences whose subject matter is involves the higher order prop-
erties.
6Topic neutral characterization is important to the mind body identity theory
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in order to respond to the disparate properties argument (Levin, 2004). The identity
theorist has to locate the differences between mental and physical predicates at the
linguistic level; mental and physical predicates don't mean the same thing. The ob-
jection here, roughly, and in breif. Is that mental and physical predicates couldn’t
come to have different meanings unless they picked out some real difference in the
world. See also Shaffer’s “Mental Events and the Brain” (pg.67) and, in response,
James Cornman’s “The Identity of Mind and Body” (pg.73), both in Materialism and
the Mind-Body Problem, David M. Rosemthal, ed. (Indiana: Hackett Publishing
Company, 2000).
7For more on the history and background of Ramsey sentences, which were
apparently independantly discovered by Carnap, see Stathis Psillos (2006).
8For a more general and more thorough account of this process see Lewis
(1970).
9See Lewis (1966).
10Intuitively, it looks as though the lower order properties would have the
same general, topic neutral characterizations. The only discernable difference be-
tween them will be in their particular details, which will have been scrubbed away by
the Ramsification process. This is to turn the argument from disparate properties on
its head. See footnote 7.
11What the role functionalist needs, I think, is for higher order properties to
have some general pattern in common with their lower order properties, a pattern in
virtue of which we can explain the composition relation between them and some
specific pattern that differs between them by which we can distinguish them as dis-
tinct ontological entities. What Ramsification really does is preclude the possibility
of making this distinction between general and specific causal roles.
12You would no sooner detail a difference in the causal roles of the higher
and lower order properties in terms of a Ramsey sentence than Lewis would insist
that you have an entirely different ‘higher order’ property.
13Or rather his idea of functional roles and what it is to play one.
14Lewis (1966) originally used a more general form of the argument to argue
against mind body dualism.
15And thus that P does not really exist. Its status is merely semantic, and not
ontological as we originally thought.
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